Analysis

The Decline of the Left

‱ 6 min read

There is no focus on building collective power on the political Left, at least not in the West. This is both cause and effect of the disintegration of the Labour Movement.

In the following article, we outline how we understand this process and trace how the trajectory of different parts of the movement contributed to a downward spiral of diminishing collective power and cohesion.11This outline draws on a variety of sources, amongst them Bevins (2023), Gilbert & Williams (2022), MĂŒller (2024), Nunes (2021), Srnicek & Williams (2015), Tooze (2022a, 2022b, 2024a), and Winant (2019). We focus on our own context: the so-called United Kingdom. ↩

Weakened Unions

The power of unions in the West has shrunk significantly over the last few decades. In the UK, this decline resulted from a convergence of oppressive anti-union legislation under Thatcher, giving in to “exit threats” of capital flight to lower-wage countries, and the fracturing of working-class solidarity through global supply chains.

At the same time, the low-inflation regime imposed by central banks decorrelated price movements across markets, reducing incentives for collective bargaining while encouraging individual career development.22Tooze (2022b) ↩ This prompted unions to shift from an active “Organising Model” to a passive “Service Model” focused on bureaucratic service provision rather than radical collective action.33Wikimedia, “Organizing model” ↩

As a result, institutions that historically gave “intelligent and articulate expression to working-class grievances” and “framed inequality through social realities rather than imaginary enemies”44Tooze (2022b) ↩ have been weakened or eliminated. This has increased the working class’s vulnerability to fascism.

Co-opted Parties

Under leaders like Clinton, Blair, and Schröder, the professional-managerial class came to dominate the parliamentary Left in the West.55Tooze (2024b). On the discourse around the PMC within the Left, see Winant (2019). ↩ As a result, it shifted priorities from working-class to middle-class interests, replacing strategies focused on collective power with social liberalisation.

Material progress was made dependent on overall economic growth and cheap goods from exploited lower-income countries rather than fair profit distribution. This growth-dependent model succeeded during the stable 1990s but caused extreme inequality, especially over the past 15 years.

In effect, socialist and social democratic parties in the West turned from challengers to supporters of neoliberalism. In some areas (restriction of labour rights, reductions in benefits, deregulation of financial markets) they became the first enabler of neoliberal policies not despite, but because of the residual trust that they would act in the interest of workers.

The result is a politically abandoned66As we understand it, the resurgence of more radical left-wing parties is already part of the recent hegemonic crisis. ↩ and fractured working class, segments of which have consequently moved toward the political Right.77See Brenan (2024) on data for the US. For a discussion of details and implications see Licata (2025). ↩

Failing “Vertical” Models

For the more radical parts of the movement, by the early 20th century “vertical” models of leftist political organisation appeared to have solved the challenges of revolutionary politics. The 1917 Russian Revolution seemed to demonstrate the successful welding of theory and practice in a victorious party form, proving it was possible for the Left to take and retain power. For several decades, this model of centralised, hierarchical organisation provided both theoretical coherence and practical success.

However, by the late 1960s, the credibility of the model had eroded. As actually existing socialism drifted from its stated goals, revolutionary movements in the West failed, and theoretical foundations like historical determinism came under challenge, activists concluded that the model “had turned out bad where it had not worked and even worse where it had.”88Nunes (2021) ↩

The collapse of the Soviet bloc further marginalised vertical approaches, leaving movements unable to embrace traditional party forms yet struggling to develop adequate organisational alternatives for system change.

Failing “Horizontal” Models

In reaction to the marginalisation of vertical models and out of a deep mistrust of hierarchical structures, a “horizontal,” autonomy-focused “1968 left” emerged in explicit opposition to the party-centered “1917 left.”99Ibid. ↩

But by rejecting hierarchy, horizontal movements like Occupy slipped into decision-making paralysis over representation, process, and authority. At the same time, individuals avoided leadership roles to prevent appearing dominant or power-hungry.

This anti-hierarchical stance caused radicals to marginalise themselves again by treating power as inherently corrupt rather than a necessary tool.1010Bevins (2023) ↩ This resulted in movements that mostly focused on small-scale direct action and local organising,1111Srnicek & Williams (2015) ↩ creating short-term revolutionary experiences1212Milburn & Gilbert (2021) ↩ rather than building the organisational capacity needed to scale,1313Nunes (2021) ↩ achieve long-term outcomes, or grasp the hegemonic power1414Srnicek & Williams (2015) ↩ required for system change.

An Exclusive Culture

Far from prefiguring a better world, the Left’s internal culture weakened its cohesion and limited its collective power, contributing to its decline.

Practices originally aimed at collective liberation, e.g. diversity, equity, and inclusion policies, proved susceptible to commodification and co-option. This resulted in “middle-class wokeness,” at the expense of supporting workers’ struggles and providing a class-based analysis.

“Cancel culture” undermined deeper work on dismantling internalised oppression systems by focusing on attack instead of education. Moral judgement of transgressions and the use of shame to change behaviour further alienated potential allies, focusing on individual “moral performance” instead of overcoming the patriarchal, colonial and racist system we have inherited.

All of this made it difficult to build solidarity and alliances across causes and issues.

No New Strategies

Last but not least, the Left has stagnated intellectually, recycling old strategies while the Right is adapting to new contexts and technologies. This creates a stark contrast to Marxism’s heyday when revolutionary ideas were abundant.

This theoretical exhaustion has eliminated the theory-induced optimism that once made left-wing thinking compelling, rendering it a less attractive ideological “meme” and driving the shift from outcome-focused politics toward revolutionary experiences.

The Left’s depleted theoretical foundations require fundamental renewal to regain strategic relevance and motivational power.

References

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